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Using annual data for 60 countries over 1980–2014, we study the drivers of fiscal adjustments,
expansions, and their duration. In contrast to most previous studies, the identification of these
fiscal events relies on breaks in their data generating process. Our findings suggest that a few
political and institutional variables play a role in determining the occurrence and the duration of
fiscal adjustments and expansions. The results also highlight the importance of analyzing the
likelihood of fiscal events together with their persistence. Factors that do not affect the occurrence
of fiscal adjustments or expansions may influence their persistence once initiated.1. Introduction
The analysis of political-economy factors influencing the occurrence of fiscal policy adjustments and expansions has received
considerable attention in the literature since the publication of Alesina and Perotti (1995) seminal paper. Yet, empirical research to date
has yielded very mixed evidence; there is clearly no consensus about the drivers of fiscal expansions and adjustments.
Most previous research has focused on fiscal adjustments reflecting that mounting fiscal deficits and debt were pushing economies
towards unsustainable fiscal policy paths. Fiscal adjustments may be politically costly in the short run as they have noticeable short-term
effects on economic activity and/or specific constituencies (Von Hagen, 2002). On the other hand, delaying fiscal adjustments can even
be costlier (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). It is therefore important to identify which economic, political and institutional factors affect the
occurrence and the duration of fiscal adjustments over time. However, the empirical literature has mainly studied ‘successful’ fiscal
adjustments, where success is defined in terms of the permanency of the effects of adjustments on budget deficits and/or government
debt. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies (Mierau et al., 2007; Lavigne, 2011) studied the drivers of fiscal adjustments
independently of their success.
The determinants of fiscal expansions and their persistence have not received the same attention as those of fiscal adjustments.
Instead, most of the empirical literature focused on the drivers of fiscal deficits rather than on the determinants of the occurrence and
duration of fiscal expansions.
The most common approach to identify fiscal expansions and adjustments is to use ad hoc, one-size-fits-all criteria (e.g. a change in
the cyclically adjusted budget balance above 1.5 percentage points). This approach has several limitations (International Monetary
Fund, 2010; Wiese et al., 2018). Most importantly, using one-size-fits-all thresholds does not take into account that budget balancend Business, Room 510, Nettelbosje 2, 9747 AE, Groningen, the Netherlands.
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adjustments or expansions when in fact fiscal policy did not change. An additional problem appears when these one-size-fits-all
thresholds are combined with ad hoc lengths of time in order to classify fiscal adjustments (as successful or unsuccessful, large or
small, and gradual or fast). This has been common practice in the empirical literature and we believe it blurs the occurrence of fiscal
adjustments and their persistence over time, making a proper analysis of the drivers of fiscal adjustments and their duration problematic.
Our paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we follow a similar method as Wiese et al. (2018) to identify fiscal
adjustments and expansions in 60 countries over the period 1980–2014. This approach relies on changes in the data generating process
of fiscal variables to identify fiscal expansions and adjustments. Second, we examine a large set of political-economy determinants of
fiscal adjustments and expansions. As explained above, the drivers of fiscal expansions have received scant attention so far.1 Third, we
also consider the impact of financial crises on the probability of fiscal adjustments and expansions. So far, the literature mainly studied
the impact of financial crises on fiscal policy outcomes (see, for instance, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Laeven and Valencia, 2018).
Finally, we also analyze the factors influencing the duration of fiscal adjustments and expansions. As we will show, factors that do not
affect the occurrence of fiscal adjustments or expansions may influence their persistence once initiated.
Our study takes Mierau et al. (2007) as a starting point as these authors were the first to systematically examine the drivers of fiscal
adjustments for a sample of OECD countries, considering a large set of potential political and economic determinants. Our set of
explanatory variables is therefore very similar to the determinants considered by Mierau et al. (2007). However, our study differs along
four dimensions. First, our analysis is not confined to OECD countries only, but includes all countries for which sufficient data is
available. Second, we not only consider the occurrence of fiscal adjustments, but also examine the drivers of fiscal expansions.
Furthermore, we also analyze the drivers of the duration of fiscal adjustments and expansions. Finally, instead of relying on “one-si-
ze-fits-all criteria” to identify fiscal expansions and adjustments, we follow Wiese et al. (2018) and use the Bai-Perron methodology.
We use a conditional logit model to estimate the drivers of fiscal adjustments and fiscal expansions, and survival analysis to study the
determinants of their duration. Our results suggest that economic factors in general are not the only drivers of fiscal adjustments and
expansions and their persistence. Some political and institutional variables do have a significant effect. This is particularly true for fiscal
expansions, which seem to be driven mainly by political and institutional determinants. In contrast to previous studies, we find that
government ideology plays an important role due to its association with the persistence of both fiscal adjustments and expansions. Last,
but not least, our findings highlight the importance of jointly analyzing the likelihood of fiscal adjustments and expansions and their
survival over time. Our results suggest that the occurrence of fiscal adjustments/expansions are not driven by the same factors that
determine their duration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of the literature on the drivers of fiscal adjustments and ex-
pansions. The hypotheses to be tested are also formulated here. Section 3 discusses our data and estimation framework, after which
section 4 presents the estimation results. This section also discusses the outcomes of several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
2.1. Determinants of fiscal adjustments and expansions
The conclusions of studies on the determinants of fiscal adjustments (irrespective of their success) are rather diverse. Economic
factors, like economic growth and unemployment, and the fiscal position of the government (as reflected in the budget balance and the
debt-to-GDP ratio) clearly matter. However, studies report very mixed evidence on the importance of political-economy factors.
Alesina and Perotti (1995) find that governments are more (less) likely to initiate a large fiscal expansion (adjustment) in recession
years than in non-recession years. Coalition governments have a slightly higher tendency to engage in very expansionary fiscal policies,
while minority governments are more likely to introduce fiscal adjustments. Alesina and Perotti (1995) also report that the probability
of observing large fiscal expansions is lower with right-wing governments, while left-wing governments are more likely to carry out very
tight fiscal policies. Elections do not appear as an important factor. The results of Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) suggest that fiscal
consolidations are more likely in periods when the domestic economy is doing well and also in the presence of high debt-to-GDP ratios.
Alesina et al. (2006) find that fiscal adjustments are more likely to take place in time of crisis, when the party in office has a large
majority, and when the executive branch faces fewer constraints. The results of Mierau et al. (2007) indicate that a weak fiscal situation
increases the likelihood of fiscal adjustments and that economic growth is not a strong determinant of fiscal effort. Upcoming elections
negatively influence the occurrence of rapid fiscal adjustments. If a country has embarked on a broad policy reform, this makes the
occurrence of a gradual (but not a rapid) fiscal adjustment more likely. Finally, Lavigne (2011) reports that in advanced economies
institutional quality (rule of law) makes implementing large – and more persistent – fiscal adjustments more probable. In these
countries, the need for adjustment appears to be determined by low growth and inflation. For developing economies, Lavigne (2011)
finds that low institutional quality is usually associated with large and more persistent fiscal adjustments. In these countries, the
occurrence of large adjustments is also driven by inflation.1 There is of course an extensive literature on political budget cycles (PBC); see, for instance, Castro and Martins (2018) and de Haan and Klomp
(2013) for surveys. However, the underlying research question of this line of research is different, namely what drives fiscal policy outcomes (notably
the budget balance) versus what drives fiscal expansions/adjustments. So, in the PBC literature the left-hand side variable is a fiscal policy outcome
variable (mostly some proxy for the budget balance), while in the fiscal expansions/adjustment literature the left-hand side variable is the probability
of a fiscal expansion/adjustment.
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Table 1
Potential drivers of the likelihood of fiscal events and expected impact.
Potential drivers Hypothesized effect on the likelihood of:
Fiscal adjustment Fiscal expansion
Economic Debt-to-GDP ratio þ –
(Lagged) Budget balance þ –
Unemployment - þ
Inflation - –
GDP growth þ –
Financial crisis * þ
Institutional quality Voice and accountability þ –
Rule of law þ –
Political-economy Size fragmentation government - þ
Political fragmentation government - þ
Strength of government þ –
Government ideology - þ
Upcoming elections - þ
Broad policy reform þ *
Cabinet change/government crisis - þ
Notes: The 0þ0 sign represents an expected positive effect, 00 stands for an expected negative effect, and 0*0 means that we do not have a clear
expectation in view of opposing results reported in the literature.
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budget deficits rather than fiscal expansions as such (e.g. Roubini and Sachs, 1989; de Haan and Sturm, 1994; Kontopoulos; Perotti,
1999; Volkerink and de Haan, 2001). Eslava (2011) provides a survey of this literature. The studies mentioned suggest that
political-economy factors are important drivers of budget deficits, but they identify different determinants. For instance, de Haan and
Sturm (1994) find that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes. Roubini and Sachs
(1989) report that weak governments, i.e. the presence of many political parties in a ruling coalition, have higher deficits. Consistent
with this view, Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) and Volkerink and de Haan (2001) find evidence that more size-fragmented govern-
ments (i.e. governments consisting of many parties or with a lot of spending ministers) have larger deficits. Volkerink and de Haan
(2001) also report that strong support for the government in parliament is associated with lower deficits while political fragmentation
(i.e. large ideological differences among coalition parties) is associated with higher deficits.
Based on the literature reviewed above, Table 1 presents a summary of the potential drivers of fiscal adjustments and expansions and
their expected signs. Online Appendix 1 offers a more extensive motivation of the hypotheses.2.2. Determinants of the duration of fiscal adjustments and expansions
There is only scant empirical research on the determinants of the duration of fiscal events which is biased towards the study of the
persistence of fiscal adjustments. Some studies consider political-economy variables.
Von Hagen et al. (2002) find that high initial debt levels and a weak cyclical position of the domestic economy contribute, weakly, to
the likelihood of sustaining consolidations. Gupta et al. (2005) report that higher indebtedness lowers the risk of ending an adjustment.
In turn, institutional quality (as measured by corruption) increases the risk of ending a fiscal adjustment. Finally, these authors report
that crises do not have any influence on the duration of fiscal adjustments. The results of Illera and Mulas-Granados (2008) indicate that
the larger the size of the cabinet, the shorter the length of the consolidation, while elections tend to reduce the duration as well. Finally,
these authors also find that a higher debt ratio is associated with a longer duration of consolidations. Agnello et al. (2013) conclude that
higher budget deficits increase the persistence of fiscal adjustments and that higher debt levels have the opposite effect. Good economic
conditions contribute to shorter consolidations, but also higher inflation rates seem to have the same effect. Finally, they also highlight
that financial crises may end the adjustment process sooner. Foremny et al. (2017) report that both a higher lagged balance and a higher
real GDP growth increase the duration of fiscal adjustments. They also find that right-wing government are associated with longer
consolidations. Finally, de Haan and Parlevliet (2018) highlight that structural reforms in labor and product markets may improve the
resilience of the economy to adverse shocks hence reducing the size and duration of fiscal expansions.
Table 2 shows the expected sign on the coefficients of the variables that may affect the survival of fiscal adjustments and expansions
over time. Some conclusions of Lavigne (2011), who studies the determinants of adjustments that last for 5 or more years, are taken into
consideration in this table.2 It is clear from this table that in many cases the influence of political and economic variables on the duration
of both fiscal events is not clear or unknown.2 Lavigne (2011) finds that the duration of fiscal adjustments is shorter the higher economic growth and the higher the level of inflation. Likewise,
the stronger the rule of law, the longer is the duration of the adjustments. Note, however, that Lavigne reports opposite results for inflation and the
rule of law for developing countries.
3
Table 2
Potential drivers of the duration of fiscal events and expected impact.
Potential drivers Hypothesized effect on the duration of:
Fiscal adjustment Fiscal expansion
Economic Debt-to-GDP ratio þ –
(Lagged) Budget balance - *
Unemployment - þ
Inflation þ –
GDP growth - –
Financial crisis - þ
Institutional quality Voice and accountability * *
Rule of law þ *
Political-economy Size fragmentation government * þ
Political fragmentation government * þ
Strength of government þ *
Government ideology - þ
Upcoming elections - þ
Broad policy reform * –
Cabinet change/government crisis - *
Notes: The 0þ0 sign represents an expected positive effect, 00 stands for an expected negative effect, and 0*0 means that we do not have a clear
expectation in view of opposing results reported in the literature.
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3.1. Data
3.1.1. Fiscal adjustments and expansions
Our dataset of fiscal adjustments and expansions is based on the yearly figures of the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) from the
International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook database (2017).3 We follow the approach for determining the presence of fiscal
adjustments introduced by Wiese et al. (2018) and extend it to fiscal expansions. In general, a fiscal event is identified by changes in the
Data Generating Process (DGP) of the CAB. These breaks are estimated using an algorithm developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2000,
2003), referred to as BP from here onwards.4
The BP algorithm identifies the presence of a fiscal event, but it does not automatically find its starting point, nor does it classify the
event as a fiscal adjustment or expansion. Therefore, we proceed as follows. The nature of the break is simply determined by comparing
the average level of the budget balance directly before and after the break found. An increase indicates the presence of a fiscal
adjustment and a decrease indicates a fiscal expansion. The beginning date of the fiscal adjustment/expansion is then found at the year
around the break at which the positive/negative change in the base variable started. In a few cases, the fiscal situation of a country may
have been an improvement/deterioration for a long time, which will lead to the beginning of the fiscal adjustment/expansion to be
located further away from the BP break.
Using this approach, and considering the period 1980–2014, we are able to detect 122 structural breaks in the CAB series (BP
breakpoints) for a total of 60 countries. Table 3 shows that, out of the total, 62 of these events correspond to fiscal adjustments and 60 to
fiscal expansions (Table A3.1 in the online appendix presents a detailed list of the BP breakpoints and fiscal events per country.).
Dummy variables are created to reflect the presence of either a fiscal adjustment or an expansion. Another important variable is the
duration of the fiscal adjustments and expansions, which is simply the number of years they last. In our sample, duration is generally
larger for fiscal adjustments than for expansions. The variable called average size reflects the accumulated change in the CAB figures
either during the first year of the event and for its total length.3 Using the non-cyclically adjusted budget balance for this purpose would for sure yield biased results, because the actual budget balance is affected
by the state of the business cycle. That is why we follow previous studies in this line of research and use the cyclically adjusted budget balance.
4 A detailed description of the methodology followed to identify both fiscal adjustments and expansions is available in the online Appendix 2, while
Appendix 3 offers more details regarding the fiscal adjustments and expansions in our sample. We rely on the recommendations of Bai and Perron
(2000, 2003) who present an extensive simulation analysis pertaining to the size and power of the tests, the accuracy of the asymptotic approxi-
mations for the confidence intervals and the relative merits of different methods to estimate the number of breaks. For example, in order to avoid
having to arbitrarily pre-specify a particular number of breaks to make inference, we follow BP’s recommendations and use the double maximum
tests, the sequential procedure, and if necessary also the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) to determine the final number of breaks. In essence, what
these tests do is to try out several different specifications, given some upper bound m, and then select the most adequate among these. We used an
upper bound of 5 as recommended by Bai and Perron (2003). Likewise, for the trimming parameter h which specifies a minimum number of ob-




Descriptive statistics of fiscal adjustments and expansions.
Countries Events Average duration (years) Average size (% of GDP)
First year Total
Adjustments 45 62 3.63 2.12 5.69
Developed 24 33 4.09 1.79 5.91
Expansions 48 60 2.97 1.83 5.45
Developed 24 24 3.45 1.22 5.56
Total 60 122 3.30 – –
Notes: Fiscal adjustments and expansions obtained using multiple breaks technique (Bai and Perron, 1998) from an unbalanced panel with a minimum
of 14 observations per country. Developed indicates the numbers for advanced economies. Table A5.2 in the online Appendix 5 shows the classification
of the countries in our sample.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics of the duration/survival of fiscal events.
Adjustments Expansions
Cases 62 60
Time at risk (years) 225 178
Failure rate 0.275 0.337
Mean survival (years) 3.63 2.96
Min survival (years) 1 1
Max survival (years) 9 7
Notes: Fiscal adjustments and expansions obtained using multiple breaks technique (Bai and Perron, 1998).
F.M. Giesenow et al. European Journal of Political Economy 64 (2020) 101911Table 4 presents more details regarding the survival analysis of these events. For the analysis of the duration of either adjustments or
expansions, we follow the literature and create a variable called failure that assumes a value of one if the event has failed and zero
otherwise.
3.1.2. Other variables
The economic variables used as controls—i.e. the lagged cyclically adjusted balance, real annual GDP growth, the debt-to-GDP ratio,
unemployment, and inflation—are self-explanatory; data come from the IMF and theWorld Bank (see Table A5.1 in the online appendix
for details). The occurrence of a financial crisis is measured by a dummy variable which is one if a crisis has occurred in that year
according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and zero otherwise. As debt crises may be different than other types of crisis, we also use a debt
crisis dummy which is constructed in the same way as the financial crisis dummy.
We capture institutional quality by indicators of ‘voice and accountability’ and the ‘rule of law’, representing the accountability and
responsiveness of a government to its citizens and a nation’s economic governance, respectively. Both institutional variables come from
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann et al., 2010), but they are included as backward-looking three-year
averages, where the current year is not included, in order to account for possible problems of endogeneity. The first variable measures
what Acemoglu and Robinson (2013, p. 36) have in mind when they explain why the quality of political institutions matters in
explaining the different economic fates of Mexico and the US: “Unlike in Mexico, in the United States the citizens could keep politicians
in check and get rid of ones who would use their offices to enrich themselves or create monopolies for their cronies.” In studies on
economic growth, an index of the rule of law is often interpreted as an indicator of economic governance (see. e.g. Rigobon and Rodrik,
2005). The World Bank provides data on these two variables only from 2002 onwards.
The political-economy variables considered (see Table 1) are mostly constructed using information from the Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). Following Mierau et al. (2007), we consider the following political-economy variables in this analysis:
 The effective number of political parties in the government is used to measure size fragmentation of the government.
 Political fragmentation of the government is measured using an indicator similar to the one proposed by Volkerink and de Haan
(2001):5








where Seatsj refers to the number of seats of party j in parliament and Total to the total number of seats in parliament. Complexionj refers
to the ideological complexion of party j, and is measured on a 1 (right-wing) to 3 (left-wing) scale.5 Finally, the variable IPG reflects the
ideological position of the government, which is discussed below.
 The strength of the government is approximated by the number of excess seats, defined by the number of seats of the ruling coalition
divided by the total number of seats in parliament. It is assumed that the more seats the coalition has in parliament, the stronger it
will be (cf. Volkerink and de Haan, 2001).
 The ideological position of the government (IPG) is determined using a measure proposed by Volkerink and de Haan (2001):





 Broad policy reform is measured by using the first difference of the economic freedom index of the Frazer Institute (2015). A change
in economic freedom is associated with the type of reforms proposed by the IMF and the World Bank (de Haan et al., 2006).
 Upcoming elections measured by a dummy variable, indicating a 1 when an election is held the upcoming year. This variable is based
on the politi15 variable from the cross-national time-series data archive (Wilson, 2015).
 The degree of political instability is approximated by two dummy variables: the first indicating a change of cabinet, the second
indicating the occurrence of a government crisis. Both dummy variables are 1 when the event occurs and zero otherwise. A cabinet
change is defined as a change of president or prime minister, or as a replacement of at least 50% of the ministers. A government crisis
is defined as a situation which could lead to the downfall of the ruling government. Both variables come from the cross-national time-
series data archive (Wilson, 2015).
The number of observations is restricted due to the limited availability of fiscal data, especially of the cyclically adjusted balance,
which is needed to construct our dependent variables. The descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table A5.1 in the online
appendix, together with their sources.3.2. Estimation framework
3.2.1. Determinants of fiscal events (conditional logit)
We start by regressing the dummy variable representing the occurrence of a fiscal adjustment or expansion on a set of traditional
control variables: the fiscal position of the government (lagged cyclically adjusted balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio) and economic
circumstances (inflation, unemployment and real GDP growth). Since the dependent variable is binary, normally logit fixed effects
would be used to estimate the model.6 However, the number of parameters in the model would be very high due to the large number of
countries, captured by the fixed effects of the model. This problem, known as the incidental parameters problem, prevents consistent
estimation. Following Mierau et al. (2007), we therefore use conditional logit estimation, where the likelihood function is conditioned
on a minimum sufficient statistic, which is in our case the number of fiscal adjustments (expansions) per country. A second problem, the
temporal dependence of the dependent variable, is caused by its binary nature. This will render the results inconsistent. Beck et al.
(1998) propose a solution to this problem by including a set of dummy variables, marking the set of years since the occurrence of a fiscal
adjustment (expansion). However, this approach would imply the loss of too many degrees of freedom and will lead to inconsistency.
Therefore, we follow another suggestion of Beck et al. (1998), namely adding several variables to the base model to control for temporal
dependence. The dummy variables are replaced by three natural cubic smoothing splines, based on the occurrence of adjustments
(expansions), and a variable reflecting the number of past adjustments (expansions). The latter variable is suggested as solution to the5 In view of the large sample of countries, more fine-grained measures are not available. We therefore follow most previous studies examining the
impact of ideology using large samples of countries and use the World Bank Political Database for our purposes.
6 The fixed effects model would function as follows (adopted from HYPERLINK \l "" \o "" \h Verbeek, 2015). Assuming the relation y*it ¼ x’itβþ αi þ
εit , where y*it is unobserved and represents the inclination to adjust. This inclination depends, amongst others, on unobserved country characteristics
αi. As such, we only observe yit ¼ 1 if y*it > 0 and otherwise yit ¼ 0. This gives the probability to observe a particular fiscal event (Mierau et al.,
2007): Pðyit ¼ 1Þ ¼ Pðy*it > 0ÞPð¼ x’itβ þ αi þ εit > 0Þ ¼ Pð εit  x’itβ þ αiÞ ¼ Fðx’itβ þ αiÞ.
6
Fig. 1. Cox–Snell residuals.
F.M. Giesenow et al. European Journal of Political Economy 64 (2020) 101911presumed dependence of the fiscal events (cf. Mierau et al., 2007). As such, our model includes the proposed variables by Beck et al.







þ β4INitþ β5UNitþ β6GDPgrowthitþβ7NPEit þβ8TSLEit þ β9spline1þβ10spline2þβ11spline3þεit
(3)
where FE is a binary variable that represents the occurrence of a fiscal adjustment/expansion, PB is the cyclically adjusted balance, IN is
inflation, and UN is unemployment. Also, NPE represents the number of prior events (either adjustments or expansions) and TSLE
reflects the time (years) since the last fiscal event. This is what we call the baseline model. Then, following the approach of Mierau et al.
(2007), the financial crises, institutional and political economy variables are regressed one by one (along with the control variables) on
the binary dependent variables constructed.
3.2.2. Determinants of the duration of fiscal events (survival analysis)
Typically, duration analysis involves two steps, first a non-parametric analysis in which the dependence of duration of fiscal ad-
justments and expansions on time is analyzed. And secondly, a parametric analysis in which other factors, apart from time dependency,
are included to account for the observed variation in the duration of the fiscal events. The non-parametric analysis tries to disentangle
the (positive or negative) dependence of fiscal events on their accumulated duration. This is typically done by estimating two functions.
First, the survivor function, which is defined as:7
Table 5
Determinants of the probability and duration of fiscal adjustments: Summary.
Probability of adjustment a Duration of adjustment b
Debt-to-GDP ratio þ þ
(Lagged) Budget balance      
Unemployment þ þ þ
Inflation
GDP growth
NPA   þ þ þ
TSLA   
Financial crisis
Debt crisis
Voice and accountability þ þ




Government ideology þ þ




Notes: The number of plusses or minuses represents the strength of the statistical test: three for the 1% significance level, and two for the
5% significance level. NPA¼Number of previous adjustments. TSLA ¼ Time since last adjustment. This table excludes results obtained
with confidence levels below 95%. The X marks the lack of results due to problems with that particular estimation.
a Conditional logit model, binary dependent variable.
b Hazard model estimation, dependent variable is the hazard rate of the fiscal adjustment.
F.M. Giesenow et al. European Journal of Political Economy 64 (2020) 101911SðtÞ¼PrðT  tÞ¼ 1 FðtÞ (4)and gives the probability that the duration of the fiscal adjustment (T), for example, is greater than or equal to t. And then the hazard
function, which is defined as:
hðtÞ¼PrðT ¼ t =T  tÞ (5)
and gives, for each duration, the probability of ending a consolidation or expansion episode conditioned on the duration of the fiscal
event through that moment. Nevertheless, non-parametric analysis has limitations; it does not allow to analyze other factor that may
explain the probability of ending fiscal adjustments and expansions. To address this issue, we perform a parametric analysis of duration.
This is done by estimating a Model of Proportional Hazard (PH), which is the duration model that is usually used to characterize the
hazard function, and it assumes that the hazard function can be split as follows:
hðt;XÞ¼ h0ðtÞ*gðXÞ (6)
where h0ðtÞ is the baseline hazard function that captures the dependency of data to duration, and gðXÞ is a function of individual
variables. This function of explanatory variables is a negative function usually defined as gðXÞ ¼ expðX’βÞ. Note that in this proportional
specification, regressors intervene re-escalating the conditional probability of ending a period of fiscal adjustment or expansion, not its
own duration. This model can be estimated initially without imposing any specific functional form on the baseline hazard function,
following the Cox (1972) model:
hðt;XÞ¼ h0ðtÞ*expðX’βÞ (7)
An alternative is to impose a specific parametric form on the function h0ðtÞ. The models most commonly used are the Weibull Model
and the Exponential Model. In the first one, h0ðtÞ ¼ ρtρ1, where ρ is a parameter that has to be estimated. When ρ ¼ 1, the Weibull8
Table 6
Determinants of the probability and duration of fiscal expansions: Summary.
Probability of expansion a Duration of expansion b
Debt-to-GDP ratio




NPE þ þ þ
TSLE   
Financial crisis X þ þ
Debt crisis X  




Strength of government    þ þ
Government ideology þ þ þ
Upcoming elections
Broad policy reform þ þ þ   
Cabinet change
Government crisis
Notes: The number of plusses or minuses represents the strength of the statistical test: three for the 1% significance level, and two for the
5% significance level. NPE¼Number of previous expansions. TSLE¼ Time since last expansion. This table excludes results obtained with
confidence levels below 95%. The X marks the lack of results due to problems with that particular estimation.
a Conditional logit model, binary dependent variable.
b Hazard model estimation, dependent variable is the hazard rate of the fiscal expansion.
F.M. Giesenow et al. European Journal of Political Economy 64 (2020) 101911Model is equal to the Exponential Model, where there exists no dependency on duration. On the other hand, when the parameter ρ > 1,
there exists a positive dependency on duration, and a negative dependency when ρ < 1. Therefore, by estimating ρ, it is possible to test
the hypothesis of positive duration dependency of fiscal consolidations (also called adjustment fatigue). Given that we have several
possible parametric models, we test the power of each model, through graphic analysis of the Cox and Snell (1968) residuals. These
residuals are defined as follows:
be¼  log Sðt = xÞ: (8)
If the model fits the data, then the plot of the cumulative hazard versus be should be a straight line with slope equal to unity and
beginning at the origin. As can be observed in Fig. 1, the Weibull plot clearly satisfies the exponential requirement for most of the time,
except for larger residuals.7 We therefore use the Weibull model.
4. Results and discussion
Table 5 (adjustments) and Table 6 (expansions) present a summary of the results for both the determinants of the occurrence of fiscal
events and their duration. The full estimation results are presented in the Appendix (Table A.1, Table A.2, Table A.3, and Table A.4) .8 In
specific cases, results are not feasible due to methodological difficulties such as lack of information or non-converging errors in the
estimations. This holds in particular for some estimations including financial crises.
4.1. Fiscal adjustments
We find significant results for several economic control variables which are consistent with our expectations. A higher debt-to-GDP-
ratio significantly increases the probability of a fiscal adjustment. However, government indebtedness is not associated with the length7 We only show the result for the case of fiscal adjustments. Results based on fiscal expansions provide the same conclusions (results available on
request).
8 In the online Appendix 6 we also present the results if we include several proxies for the presence of fiscal rules using the IMF database of fiscal
rules (Schaechter et al., 2012) as used by Gootjes et al. (2020). It turns out that fiscal rules do neither affect the likelihood that a fiscal adjustment or
expansion occurs nor their duration.
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Table 7
Logit model: dependent variable based on one-size-fits-all criteria.
Von Hagen Lavigne
(Lagged) Budget balance 0.748***b 0.550***b
Debt crisis 8.868***
Political fragmentation government 2.040*
Strength of government 7.811**
Government Ideology a 0.901**
Notes: Binary dependent variable based on alternative definitions: Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) and Lavigne
(2011). Numbers in this table represent the log-odds. Results based on countries with more than 14 observations.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a Government ideology is contemporaneously not statistically significant, but its lagged version is.
b Values from the baseline model.
F.M. Giesenow et al. European Journal of Political Economy 64 (2020) 101911of fiscal adjustments. There is also a negative impact of the lagged cyclically adjusted balance on the probability of a fiscal adjustment
and its duration. Unemployment does not influence the probability of an adjustment, but it is associated with longer fiscal adjustments.
Our results do not provide evidence that the probability of a fiscal adjustment is related to the occurrence of a financial or a debt crisis.
The results regarding the institutional variables indicate that higher levels of voice and accountability are not related to the
occurrence of fiscal consolidations. However, countries with higher levels of voice and accountability do have longer fiscal adjustments.
The rule of law is inversely related with the probability that a fiscal adjustment occurs. Political fractionalization does neither appear
related to the occurrence of fiscal consolidations nor with its duration. Upcoming elections are not related with the chance that a fiscal
adjustment takes place, but are positively associated with the persistence of fiscal adjustments. Finally, our results suggest that the more
leftist the government is (i.e. the variable has a high value), the lower the chance of fiscal adjustments ending. This could be supporting
the presence of a ‘Nixon-goes-to-China’ effect (Cukierman and Tomassi, 1998), in which the credibility of such costly measures is
increased by the fact that they are taken by a political party which traditionally has a contrary position.
4.2. Fiscal expansions
Economic control variables, with the exception of the lagged balance, are not related to fiscal expansions or their duration. A strong
fiscal position of the government makes an expansion more likely and makes it long-lasting. Governments with solid fiscal records, and
possibly low levels of debt, should be able to sustain periods of fiscal expansions over time.
Political and institutional factors explain most of the findings related to fiscal expansions. The variable ‘voice and accountability’ has
a strong negative relationship with the probability of fiscal expansions. When institutions are able to transform voters’ preferences for
lower taxes into fiscal prudence, such a result should not be surprising. In turn, government’s majority is inversely related with the
probability of fiscal expansions. But the duration of a fiscal expansion is longer under governments having large majorities in parlia-
ment. Interestingly, government ideology does not affect the probability of fiscal expansions but is associated positively with its
duration. The more leftist the government, the longer the duration of their fiscal expansions are. Finally, broad policy reform is posi-
tively associated with the occurrence of fiscal expansions. As pointed out by de Haan and Parlevliet (2018), to gain acceptance of re-
forms potential ‘losers of reform’ may need to be compensated. Nevertheless, the fiscal expansions associated to broad policy reforms
tend to be shorter.
4.3. Results using one-size-fits all criteria to determine fiscal adjustments
Although we forcefully argue against using one-size fits all criteria to identify fiscal adjustments and expansions, we re-estimated our
model for fiscal adjustments using such criteria. We consider fiscal adjustments that were obtained following one-size-fits-all criteria
proposed by Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) and Lavigne (2011). Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) consider that a fiscal adjustment takes
place if the cyclically adjusted government budget balance (as % of GDP) increases at least 1.25 percentage-point in two consecutive
years, or if it increases at least 1.5 percentage-point in one year and is positive in the other. Lavigne (2011) defines fiscal adjustments as a
continuous positive change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance of at least 1.5% of GDP over 5 years. Clearly, the time dimension is
more important in the latter definition. Using these new definitions, we identify 60 fiscal adjustments a la Von Hagen and 24 fiscal
adjustments a la Lavigne. Table 7 presents a summary of the outcomes for the model for the probability of a fiscal adjustment, showing
only coefficients that are statistically significantly different from zero.9 Political and institutional factors do not explain the probability9 Detailed results are available on request.
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more relevant role when using the definition of Lavigne. The use of a different method to identify fiscal adjustment thus explains why
our results for fiscal adjustments deviate from the findings reported by Lavigne (2011).
The fact that the results in Table 7 are different from those in Table 5 does not come as a surprise. As extensively discussed by Wiese
et al. (2018), there are serious problems using a one-size fits all criterion to identify fiscal adjustments. Most importantly, countries
having a more volatile budget process, by definition, will end up with many fiscal expansions/adjustments if the identification of these
events is based on, for example, the change in the cyclically adjusted budget balance. As Wiese et al. (2018) show for OECD countries,
the BP approach yields very different periods identified as fiscal adjustment than any of the previously used criteria to identify fiscal
adjustments.
5. Conclusion
Using annual data for 60 countries over 1980–2014, we study the drivers of fiscal adjustments, expansions, and their persistence over
time. The identification of these fiscal events relies on breaks in their data generating process following Wiese et al. (2018). This
approach is less ad hoc than commonly applied methods to identify fiscal adjustments and expansions and takes differences in volatility
of budget processes across countries into account. In our sample, we identify 62 fiscal adjustments and 60 fiscal expansions. Most fiscal
adjustments lasted between 2 and 4 years and the largest number of expansions is centered at a duration of 3 years.
Our findings suggest that a few political and institutional variables play an important role in determining the occurrence and
duration of fiscal adjustments and expansions. Our findings for the occurrence of fiscal adjustments are broadly in line with the con-
clusions of Mierau et al. (2007) based on an analysis of OECD countries. More importantly, our results highlight the relevance of
analyzing the likelihood of fiscal events together with the determinants of their persistence. Factors not affecting the occurrence of fiscal
events may influence their duration once initiated. For instance, our results suggest that the strength of government has a negative effect
on the probability of a fiscal expansion, while it has a positive effect on its duration. Our results also show that factors affecting the
probability (duration) of a fiscal expansion are not the same as those driving the probability (duration) of a fiscal adjustment. For
instance, we do not find that government strength is related to fiscal adjustments, while it affects fiscal expansions. In contrast to most
previous studies, we also find that government ideology is important: the duration of fiscal adjustments and expansions is related to
government ideology.
Finally, one caveat is in order. We have not examined whether the drivers of fiscal adjustments and expansions and their duration
differ across country groups. As some of the drivers we analyze may differ systematically across country groups (this holds, for instance,
for several institutional variables), a suggestion for future research is to analyze whether the drivers of fiscal adjustments and expansions
and their duration are different for advanced and developing countries.Declaration of competing interest
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Appendix. Detailed estimation results
Table A.1
Determinants of fiscal adjustments. Conditional logit model
Variable/Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.040** 0.005 0.005 0.081** 0.061* 0.047** 0.037* 0.042** 0.052*** 0.040** 0.068 0.041** 0.040**
(0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.032) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.049) (0.019) (0.019)
(Lagged) Budget
balance
¡0.518*** ¡0.615*** ¡0.615*** ¡0.678** ¡0.836** ¡0.510*** ¡0.527*** ¡0.517*** ¡0.540*** ¡0.497*** ¡0.817* ¡0.537*** ¡0.518***
(0.120) (0.189) (0.189) (0.324) (0.327) (0.131) (0.120) (0.120) (0.129) (0.116) (0.431) (0.103) (0.122)
Unemployment 0.032 0.027 0.028 0.023 0.072 0.003 0.063 0.026 0.062 0.055 0.018 0.090 0.032
(0.165) (0.255) (0.255) (0.160) (0.170) (0.175) (0.158) (0.174) (0.173) (0.170) (0.153) (0.158) (0.171)
Inflation 0.165 0.285 0.282 0.101** 0.114** 0.196 0.154 0.167 0.112 0.146 0.090 0.141 0.164
(0.150) (0.211) (0.202) (0.046) (0.054) (0.186) (0.146) (0.152) (0.149) (0.153) (0.065) (0.138) (0.153)
GDP growth 0.054 0.091 0.089 0.031 0.064 0.042 0.059 0.055 0.014 0.051 0.020 0.067 0.054
(0.075) (0.110) (0.110) (0.116) (0.123) (0.068) (0.079) (0.071) (0.104) (0.069) (0.126) (0.083) (0.074)
NPA ¡1.928** ¡2.878** ¡2.872** ¡3.563*** ¡3.107* ¡2.262* ¡1.916** ¡1.965** ¡2.217*** ¡1.791** 2.755 ¡1.655** ¡1.924**
(0.888) (1.441) (1.410) (1.378) (1.876) (1.296) (0.878) (0.967) (0.777) (0.895) (2.009) (0.699) (0.894)
TSLA 3.449 3.064 3.044 4.255 4.701* 3.210** 3.597 3.339 4.684 3.294 2.435* 3.123 3.448









Rule of law ¡8.702**
(4.154)


















Observations 510 384 384 217 217 483 510 510 510 481 218 503 509
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. NPA¼Number of previous adjustments. TSLA ¼ Time since last adjustment. Results based on countries with more than 14















Determinants of fiscal expansions. Conditional logit Model
Variables/Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.002 ¡0.221* 0.173 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.001 ¡0.208*** 0.001 0.002
(0.030) (0.134) (0.109) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.033) (0.028) (0.059) (0.024) (0.031)
(Lagged) Budget balance 0.549*** 0.924** 1.058** 0.870*** 0.621*** 0.570*** 0.528*** 0.597*** 0.794*** 0.695** 0.544***
(0.191) (0.467) (0.519) (0.312) (0.237) (0.209) (0.193) (0.224) (0.137) (0.296) (0.190)
Unemployment ¡0.470* 1.162 1.332 0.680 ¡0.535** 0.520** ¡0.475* 0.522 ¡0.872* ¡0.480** ¡0.470*
(0.243) (0.748) (0.945) (0.445) (0.246) (0.235) (0.256) (0.328) (0.490) (0.239) (0.243)
Inflation 0.019 0.619 0.731 0.193 0.043 0.048 0.009 0.325 ¡0.523*** 0.168 0.009
(0.323) (0.468) (0.597) (0.209) (0.324) (0.330) (0.314) (0.450) (0.161) (0.264) (0.328)
GDP growth 0.201 0.159 0.168 ¡0.287** 0.211 0.176 0.202 0.168 0.423** 0.163 0.187
(0.169) (0.194) (0.183) (0.143) (0.169) (0.178) (0.167) (0.206) (0.179) (0.150) (0.170)
NPE 2.830 0.649 1.162 2.693 2.624 2.188 2.658 3.963 0.961 2.855 2.844
(2.987) (1.971) (2.354) (2.327) (2.539) (2.824) (2.953) (3.366) (1.154) (2.820) (2.964)
TSLE 0.416 4.517 4.739 2.214** 0.854 0.283 0.465 0.517 1.037 1.034 0.528
(1.376) (3.186) (3.462) (0.974) (1.481) (1.517) (1.516) (1.434) (0.659) (1.303) (1.382)
Crisis X
Debt crisis X
Voice and accountability ¡9.566***
(3.503)
Rule of law ¡12.931*
(7.830)
Size fragmentation gov. ¡3.036*
(1.691)
Political fragmentation gov. ¡3.285*
(1.785)












Observations 483 – – 295 295 459 471 471 483 451 301 477 483
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. NPE¼Number of previous expansions. TSLE ¼ Time since last expansion. Results based on countries with more than 14















Determinants of the hazard rate fiscal adjustments. Proportional hazards. All countries
Variables/
Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Lagged) Budget
balance
0.060*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.046*** 0.061*** 0.061***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Unemployment ¡0.032*** ¡0.036*** ¡0.035*** ¡0.044*** ¡0.044*** ¡0.028** ¡0.032*** ¡0.029*** ¡0.028*** ¡0.028*** ¡0.029*** ¡0.033*** ¡0.032***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Inflation 0.012* 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010* 0.012* 0.015** 0.015*** 0.014** 0.000 0.013** 0.011*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.018) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP growth 0.000 ¡0.021 ¡0.024** 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.001
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
NPA ¡0.248*** ¡0.294*** ¡0.314*** ¡0.225* ¡0.219* ¡0.244*** ¡0.243*** ¡0.284*** ¡0.288*** ¡0.244*** ¡0.192** ¡0.241*** ¡0.253***
(0.083) (0.098) (0.103) (0.125) (0.127) (0.084) (0.084) (0.108) (0.096) (0.080) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085)
TSLA 0.041*** 0.027** 0.027** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.040***




































ln_p 0.006 0.047 0.062 0.093 0.074 0.023 0.006 0.053 0.041 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.005
Observations 551 425 425 363 363 521 539 539 551 519 365 544 550
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. NPA¼Number of previous adjustments. TSLA¼ Time since last adjustment. Results based on all countries with more than 14















Determinants of the hazard rate of fiscal expansions. Proportional hazards. All countries
Variables/
Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
(Lagged) Budget
balance
¡0.031*** ¡0.037*** ¡0.033*** ¡0.043*** ¡0.043*** ¡0.034*** ¡0.034*** ¡0.032*** ¡0.033*** ¡0.032*** ¡0.042*** ¡0.031*** ¡0.032***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
Unemployment 0.001 ¡0.009* ¡0.010* 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Inflation ¡0.022*** 0.010 ¡0.016** ¡0.032** ¡0.034** ¡0.020** ¡0.022*** ¡0.016** ¡0.014* ¡0.020*** ¡0.024** ¡0.023*** ¡0.022***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
GDP growth 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.006 0.005
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
NPE ¡0.212*** ¡0.305*** ¡0.302*** ¡0.175** ¡0.164** ¡0.273*** ¡0.219*** ¡0.223*** ¡0.273*** ¡0.247*** ¡0.221*** ¡0.226*** ¡0.214***
(0.058) (0.086) (0.083) (0.073) (0.066) (0.064) (0.060) (0.059) (0.065) (0.061) (0.071) (0.060) (0.057)
TSLE 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.022***




































_p ¡0.073** ¡0.067* ¡0.083** 0.092 ¡0.091* ¡0.061* ¡0.083*** 0.030 0.002 ¡0.068** ¡0.098*** ¡0.061** ¡0.071**
Observations 543 408 408 371 371 514 531 531 543 512 376 536 542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. NPE¼Number of previous expansions. TSLE ¼ Time since last expansion. Results based on all countries with more than 14
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